REGULATING THE DIFFUSION OF
HOSPITAL TECHNOLOGIES*
LOUISE

B.

RUSSELL

t

I
INTRODUCTION

In order to evaluate the effect of regulation on technological innovation
and diffusion in an industry, we need two benchmarks-a notion of how the
industry ought to behave and a notion of how it would behave in the absence
of regulation-so that we can judge the extent to which regulation brings it
closer to the ideal or pushes it farther away.
In much of the regulation literature the standard of ideal behavior is
the competitive market. Regulation is considered appropriate when the unregulated industry departs from the competitive ideal in important ways,
which are labelled "market failures." More precisely, the competitive standard
requires that decisions be made so that benefits (measured by price) are equal
to costs at the margin. Regulation is then judged by whether it brings the industry closer to the standard than it could get by itself. In Brookings' review
of the Ash Council's proposals for improving regulation, for example, Noll
states: "the performance of regulatory agencies is judged herein by the extent
to which their actions correct for the market failures that were the motivation
for establishing regulation. '
I bring up this basic point because the usual standards, both for how the
industry ought to behave and how it would behave in the absence of regulation, do not apply to the medical care sector, particularly the hospital industry, which is the subject of this article. The reason for the lack of application
is that before regulation was introduced the industry was subjected to extensive intervention reflecting a deliberate, although imperfectly understood,
choice to reject the market standard in medical care. Since the objectives for
medical care have been established as different from those of the usual market, it is unreasonable to criticize regulation for its inability to correct the resulting market failure. In fact, the usual sorts of regulation, which have been
* This paper was financed in part by the Brookings Institution. It is based on research that was
financed with the help of the National Science Foundation under grant PRA76-10470. The views
expressed are my own and should not be attributed to the trustees, officers, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution.
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brought in recently, are not intended to correct the most important of these
failings, at least not yet.
The crucial intervention has been the development of third party financing, first through private insurers, and then through the government in
the form of Medicare and Medicaid. National health insurance would extend
it further, but even now over 90 percent of all hospital costs are paid by third
party payers. 2 High levels of third party payment effectively remove the
budget constraint from the industry's customers, and indirectly, from the industry itself. In the absence of regulation, decisions are made to purchase
care, not whenever the benefit is greater than the cost, but whenever the benefit is greater than zero, i.e., whenever it is "needed." After all, the costs facing the decision makers-patient and doctor-are zero. This is not true in every case, of course, but it is a close enough approximation to give an accurate
picture of how the industry works.
Technically speaking, this is market failure on a grand scale, but this market failure has been consciously and deliberately induced. Further, it is still
very popular and few people will suggest openly that it should be changed.
The rhetoric of need-all medical care that is needed should be provided
-still dominates the discussion of medical care issues. Hardly anyone will argue that the usual standard, marginal benefits equal to marginal costs, should
be the rule for hospital care.
What then is regulation supposed to accomplish in the hospital industry?
The primary purpose of regulation is to minimize the cost of care, while holding to the principle that all care that is needed should be provided. The belief
that regulation can be helpful is based on two assumptions. The first is that
the industry by itself is not doing a reasonable job of minimizing costs. Without a budget constraint, hospitals have no incentive to minimize costs, but unless they have objectives that do not parallel the "needed care" objective, neither do they have any particular incentive to do otherwise. If other objectives
exist and are important, then considerable extra cost may be incurred. The
second assumption is that the regulatory process can improve matters-that it
can root out inefficiencies and unnecessary costs-and that the cost of the
regulatory process will be less than the savings it brings. Thus, current regulation of hospitals in general and of technologies in particular is based on notions of technical, rather than economic, efficiency.
In Section II of this paper, I will discuss further the effects on technological diffusion of the preregulation intervention in the hospital industry.
Preregulation intervention includes major government programs in medical
research and education as well as third party financing. Section II will outline

2. Gibson and Fisher, NationalHealth Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1977, Soc.
1978, at 3.
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a more detailed picture of the conditions regulation must deal with and the
crosscurrents in federal policy.
In Section III, I will describe the major forms of hospital regulation and,
where possible, their effects on technological diffusion. The United States' objectives and approaches to regulating technological diffusion in hospitals are
similar to those of several European countries I have studied, yet different
from one. I will review this experience briefly.
Section IV of the article will compare some of the attitudes of hospital regulators with those of other industries. Finally, I will summarize my conclusions.
II
THE INDUSTRY BEFORE REGULATION

Third party financing is an important source of revenue for all parts of
the medical care sector, but it is most important for hospitals. In 1977, it
supplied 94 percent of hospital revenues, 61 percent of physicians' revenues,
59 percent of nursing home revenues, and smaller proportions of amounts
spent on other care.' It has two effects on the adoption of technologies. Because third party payment reduces the cost of an action to industry
decision makers, technologies are adopted more quickly, more frequently, and
more extensively than they would be in its absence. Because third party payment is highest for hospitals, it creates a "bias" in favor of hospital-based
technologies.
We would thus expect to find evidence that technological diffusion proceeds more quickly and reaches a higher level where third party payment is
higher. This is a difficult phenomenon to demonstrate statistically because the
data on third party payment-especially historical data-are not detailed
enough to reflect the differences faced by individual hospitals when they
made their decisions about particular technologies.
In my statistical analyses of the adoption of technologies by metropolitan
hospitals, fragments of evidence turned up:4 cobalt and electroencephalography have been adopted more readily where the level of insurance in the
early 1960s was higher, and where it grew more rapidly over the years that
followed. The percent of a hospital's beds allocated to intensive care, and
again the adoption of cobalt, are higher in areas where Medicare pays a
higher proportion of hospital costs. Open-heart surgery has been adopted
more widely where insurance growth has been greater. Because the data for
third party payment are so poor, these results cannot be considered precise,
only indicative.
Analysis of national trends showed that the diffusion of several
3.
4.

Id. at 7.
L. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS 64, 97, 128-29 (1979).
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technologies increased in smaller hospitals-always the last to adopt a new
technology-after the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the mid1960s. 5 Further, Feldstein has demonstrated the general effect of insurance
on the equilibrium price set by hospitals, although his work does not link this
effect to technological diffusion statistically.6
There is, however, another test. With the level of third party payment so
high, one would expect to find hospitals investing in technologies to the point
that marginal patient benefits are zero. This phenomenon is strikingly
demonstrated when the evidence about the costs and benefits of specific
technologies is examined. Over and over again, the pattern appears: large investments have been made and are being made in technologies whose benefits
are small, approaching, and occasionally passing, zero. 7
Kidney dialysis is an interesting example because it is possible to follow the
process as it happened. In 1967, when equipment, staff, and money were limited, a national committee recommended that dialysis be limited to people 15
to 45 years of age who had no serious disease other than chronic kidney failure. Using these criteria, there would have been about 35 new dialysis patients per million population each year.8 By 1977 Medicare had assumed most
dialysis costs and the committee's restrictions had been dropped-people of
all ages and in all states of health (including the terminally ill) were accepted
for dialysis. The current estimate is that new dialysis patients will soon level
off at close to 60 per million per year.9 Liberal financing has extended the
technology to people for whom the benefits are less than those for whom the
committee recommended priority. Similarly, dialysis at home has lost ground
rapidly to dialysis in outpatient centers. The benefits of center dialysis accrue
to the patient's family, which is freed of the time-consuming chore of helping
with dialysis, but at considerable expense to the taxpayers. Dialysis for the terminally ill and outpatient dialysis deliver small benefits at high costs. The system provides them because the benefits are greater than zero.
Intensive care is an important example because of its great expense. I have
reported elsewhere that it accounts for at least 15 percent of total hospital
costs. 10 New data show that past American Hospital Association (AHA) surveys give an incomplete count of intensive care beds and that the estimate
should be revised upwvard to 17 or 18 percent, still a lower bound." By 1972
5. Russell, The Diffusion of Hospital Technologies: Some Econometric Evidence, 12 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 482 (1977).
6. Feldstein, Hospital Cost Inflation: A Study of Nonprofit Price Dynamics, 61 Ama. EcoN. REV. 853,

870 (1971).
7.

RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 65-70, 78-79, 106, 108-10, 114-15.

8. Id. at 112.
9. Id. at 113.
10.

Id. at 157.

11.

Until the 1977 survey, the American Hospital Association asked only about beds in mixed
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most hospitals had at least one intensive care unit and the number of beds allocated to intensive care continues to grow rapidly. 12 Beds in mixed intensive
and coronary care units grew 39 percent between 1972 and 1977, while total
beds grew only 10 percent.1 3 Yet studies of the effect of intensive care on patient outcomes produce evidence of only modest benefits, such as fewer complications. Many studies find no reduction in mortality rates with intensive
care, although this has been supposed to be its major benefit for conditions
such as heart attack and stroke.
These two are not the only examples. Whenever enough information was
available to permit a general judgment of this sort, the pattern appeared, but
the details varied in keeping with the individual nature of each technology.
Specifically the pattern appeared for respiratory therapy, diagnostic radioisotopes, cobalt radiotherapy, and open-heart surgery."
The statistical analysis was able to show more about the effects of a hospital's teaching and research responsibilities than about the effects of third
party payment. These functions are as legitimate as patient care and the federal government has increased hospitals' workloads in both areas. Since hospitals use new technologies for teaching and research as well as for patient care,
government policies added indirectly to the drive to acquire technologies at
the same time that they further loosened financial constraints on acquisition.
Since World War I11" the federal government has increased enormously
the funds available for biomedical research. In 1950 national expenditures
were $161 million (the federal government supplied $73 million of that
amount). By 1975 the national total was $4.6 billion (the government's share
was $2.8 billion). The largest chunk of this money, almost $2 billion in 1975,
goes to the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which distributes most of it to
universities, medical schools, and hospitals.
The adoption of two technologies-intensive care and diagnostic radioisotopes-was affected significantly by the amount of NIH grant funds
awarded to hospitals. 1 6 Hospitals in metropolitan areas that received the
largest amounts of grant dollars committed close to one more bed per hundred to intensive care (the average in metropolitan hospitals was 5 per 100)17
and adopted diagnostic radioisotopes over a year sooner than hospitals in
first time. Beds in postoperative recovery rooms are not counted, and those in other specialized
types of intensive care units are apparently still not measured by the survey.
12. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 4 1-43, 50.
13. Data for short term general and other special hospitals from AMERICAN HOSPITAL AssoCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS, 1977, at 12, 129 (1978); AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HospITAL STATISTICS, 1972, at 34, 205 (1973).
14. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 82-84, 102-06, 108-10.
15. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, BASIC DATA RELATING TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 2 (1978); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, BASIC DATA RELATING
TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 4 (1970).
16.
17.

RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 60, 92.
The analysis considered only beds in mixed intensive and coronary care units.
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areas that received no funds. Both technologies are widely used, but remain
scientifically prestigious. Thus the statistical results agree with the nature of
the technologies.
Since the mid-1960s the federal government has devoted increasing funds
to raise the output of medical schools and other schools for professional
health support. With the growing number of medical schools (there were 88
schools in 1965, 114 in 1975) and legislation tying school subsidies to annual
increases in class size, the number of medical students grew 71 percent between 1965 and 1975, from 32,835 to 56,244.18 As these students graduated,
the number of residents in training increased from 41,357 in 1965 to 62,326
in 1974, the latest year for which data are available.'"
Both affiliation with a medical school, which includes an orientation toward research as well as a commitment to train undergraduates, and residency programs, have been significant factors in the adoption of technologies.
Virtually all the technologies I examined were influenced strongly by both
factors. A particularly striking example is that medical school affiliation and a
large number of residents raised the probability that a hospital would adopt
2
open-heart surgery by 0.6, on a scale of zero to one. '
Table I shows the distributions in 1965 and 1975 of a subgroup of the
hospitals I used in my study by affiliation with a medical school, residency
program size, and number of beds. The hospitals are those in metropolitan

areas that answered the AHA questionnaire in at least ten of the fourteen years
between 1961 and 1975. In addition, they answered the questions about affiliation and residents in the 1965 and 1975 surveys. Thus, among others, this
group excludes recently built hospitals, since a sufficient history could not be
constructed for them. The intervals for each factor are those I used in my
analysis.

Table I confirms that hospitals have become larger in this period, that
more are affiliated with medical schools, and that more have medium-sized or
large residency programs. It also shows the results of policies by the Liaison
Committee on Graduate Medical Education to improve the quality of residency programs and reduce the number of marginal programs. Proportionately fewer hospitals reported one to nine residents per 100 beds in 1975 than
in 1965, and more reported no prograin. This was an unlooked-for help in
countering the effect of federal programs aimed at medical education since,
as my analyses show, even small residency programs create additional pressures for technology.
18. Data for 1965 are from Staff of the Council of Medical Education, Medical Educatioi in the
U.S. 198 J.A.M.A. 847, 851, 864 (1966); 1975 data from Staff of the AMA Group on Medical Education in the U.S. 1977-78, 240 J.A.M.A. 2809, 2822 (1978).
19. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
DIRECTORY OF ACCREDITED RESIDENCIES,

20.

RUSSELL,supra note 4, at 52.

LIASON COMMITTI'EE ON GRADUATE M [EDICAL EDUtCATION,

1975-76, at 22 (1976).
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TABLE I
DISTRIBUTIONS OF METROPOLITAN HOSPITALS BY NUMBER OF BEDS,
MEDICAL SCHOOL AFFILIATION, AND RESIDENTS PER 100 BEDS,

Percent of hospitals
1975
1965

1965

AND

1975

Change between
1965 and 1975

Number of beds
under 100
100-199
200-299
300 or more

36.3
23.6
16.8
23.3

28.0
23.2
17.6
31.2

-8.3
-0.4
+0.8
+7.9

Medical school affiliation
no
yes

87.4
12.6

75.1
24.9

-12.3
+ 12.3

Residents per 100 beds
none
1-9
10-19
20 or more

63.5
26.3
6.9
3.3

69.1
16.8
8.0
6.2

+5.6
-9.5
+1.1
+2.9

Note: The 1975 numbers are based on data for 2,780 hospitals. The 1965 numbers are based
on data for 2,975 hospitals in the case of beds, 2,954 hospitals in the case of medical school affiliation, and 2,927 hospitals in the case of residency programs,
SOURCE: American Hospital Association 1965 and 1975 surveys.

Table II shows the estimated effects of these changes on the adoption of
three technologies. The effects are largest for open-heart surgery, with medical school affiliation and larger residency programs accounting for a +3.63
increase in the percentage of hospitals with units. These two factors increased
the percentage of hospitals with cobalt by + 1.87. The percentage of beds in
intensive care was raised by a very modest 0.13 of a point.2" As my results for
the speed of diffusion show, these factors also create pressures for the more
rapid diffusion of technologies. The estimates in Table II are crude, but they
are useful as indicators of some indirect and heretofore unmeasured effects
of federal policies.
The federal government's policies toward medical education are in the
process of convulsive change. The health manpower legislation passed in 1976
dropped the requirement that class sizes be increased in order to get subsi-

21.

The overall percentages of hospitals in the group with these three technologies should

have been computed for 1975, to provide a basis for judging the importance of the estimated effects; unfortunately, they were not. The percentages for 2,772 metropolitan hospitals selected

solely on the basis of data from the 1975 survey are available and should be a reasonably accurate
set of reference points. This second group of hospitals differs from the group used for Tables I
and I1 in a number of ways, the major one being that it includes hospitals built too recently to be
included in the first group. In 1975, 18 percent of these 2,772 hospitals reported open-heart surgery, 24 percent reported cobalt radiotherapy, and they allocated an average of 5 beds per 100 to
mixed intensive and coronary care units.
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TABLE 11
ESTIMATED EFFECTS ON THE ADOPTION OF SELECTED TECHNOLOGIES

OF THE CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTIONS OF METROPOLITAN HosPriALs III NUMBER OF
BEDS,

MEDICAL SCHOOL AFFILIATION, AND RESIDENTS PER

BETWEEN

100 BEDS

1965 AND 1975

Estimated Effect
Factor producing Percent of beds
Percent of hospitals
Percent of hospitals
change
in intensive care with open-heart surgeryV with cobalt radiotherapy
nutber of beds

+.0538

+2.25

+3.86

medical school
affiliation

+.0871

+2.75

+ 1.41

residents per
100 beds

+.0473

+0.88

+0.46

SOURCE:

ported in

Derived from Table I and the rcgression equations (including third party payment) reRUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HoSPITALS (1979) (tables 3-6, 5-2, and 5-3).

dies. 2 The Administration is trying to eliminate the subsidies altogether. It is
meeting with some success in Congress on this score, and has announced its
preference for a reduction in medical school classes. But there is a good deal of
inertia in the system and neither the direct nor the indirect effects of these
policies will be reversed immediately. The largest medical school classes have
yet to graduate, yet to enter their residency training, and yet to exert their
full influence on technological diffusion.
II
REGULATING THE DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGIES

On the premise that the phenomenon of rising hospital costs is due primarily to technical inefficiency, the government has subjected the industry to
an array of regulatory mechanisms during the last fifteen years. These attempts at regulation are not, however, as coherent as my statement suggests.
Because the attempts are based on a misunderstanding of the causes of rising
costs, a schizophrenic strain runs through them. In virtually every case, they
have been charged simultaneously with improving the qtuality of care as well
as reducing its cost.
But the goal of efficiency and cost reduction has received the most emphasis in recent years. Taking this as the primary goal, we should judge these efforts at regulation on their own grounds. The first question is not whether
they have moved the industry toward the competitive ideal, but whether they
have succeeded in reducing the cost of providing hospital care-the level of
care being set by forces outside the regulatory process-below what it would
22.

Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 295f- I (1977).
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be in their absence. There is fragmentary evidence on this point. It is impossible to tell from the evidence whether costs actually have been reduced for a
given level of services or whether some degree of nonprice rationing has been
introduced, intentionally or unintentionally. The second question is whether
the savings are greater or smaller than the cost of the regulatory process itself. There is even less evidence on this point.
The emphasis on reducing costs is recent and it is interesting to see how
quickly the conventional wisdom about technological diffusion in hospitals has
changed. It used to be believed that hospitals were undesirably slow to adopt
new technologies, that because so many of them are nonprofit they did not
have the incentive to adopt technologies as quickly as they should from the
point of view of patient benefits. In fact, however, if one applies the crude
test of comparing the speed of diffusion of hospital technologies with the
speed of technological diffusion in other, profit-motivated, industries there is
no evidence that hospitals have ever been slower. 23
The belief that the government needed to encourage the adoption of new
technologies led to the creation of the Regional Medical Program (RMP) by
the Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke Amendments of 1965.24 The RMP divided the country into approximately sixty areas and financed programs
within each to promote the use of new techniques for the care of heart disease, cancer, and stroke patients.25 In 1970, kidney disease was added to the
list. 26 As a secondary purpose, these programs were supposed to encourage
regional cooperation, in order to make the new techniques as widely available
as possible, and to reduce costs by eliminating duplication of services.
It was not long before the climate changed and the belief that hospitals
adopted technologies too slowly gave way to the belief that they adopted them
too quickly, and that too many hospitals adopted them. Nevertheless, there
was enough time for the early efforts of the RMP to have an effect before it
got caught in the cross fire. When the RMP program began, intensive care
was relatively new, although well accepted, and was applied to treatment of two
diseases under the program's jurisdiction: heart disease and stroke. Many area
programs actively promoted this technology, primarily through training programs.2 7 Their efforts were effective. By 1975, hospitals in those metropolitan
23.
24.

RUSSELL,

supra note, at 493-95.

For a history of the Regional Medical Program, see SENATE COIMI. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC

WELFARE,

NATIONAL

HEALTH

PLANNING AND

DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH

FACILITIES ASSISTANCE

No. 1285, 93D Cong., 1st Sess. 13-18, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
7842, 7854-58.

ACT OF 1974, S. REP.

CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS
25. Id. at 7855. The areas were not mutually exclusive or exhaustive. In some cases a county

was not included in any of the regional programs. In others it was included in more than one.
26. Heart Disease, Cancer, Stroke, and Kidney Disease Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 299
(1977).
27. N. Kay, The Regional Medical Programs: Contributions to Technological Diffusion (1977)
(unpublished paper).
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areas-approximately half of the total-where the programs had the most
money to spend, committed 0.4 more beds per 100 to intensive care than
other hospitals. 28 This represents an almost 10 percent increase over the average for areas with lower-funded programs. It is impossible to determine
whether the percent was higher in low-funded regions than it would have
been without the RMP, hence whether the effect of the programs was even
greater than the regressions show, because there were no regions without
funds to serve as a control group.
The RMP was launched simultaneously with a second regulatory mechanism that was more attuned to cost concerns. The certificate of need (CON)
mechanism originated with the states. New York was the first; its law went
into effect in 1965. Connecticut and Rhode Island passed laws later in the
1960s and a large number of states followed suit in the early 1970s.19 Under
these laws, hospitals wishing to make a new capital investment, or to introduce
or drop a service, must apply for state approval. If the state review board
agrees that the investment or change is desirable-that it is needed-it grants
a certificate of need and the hospital may proceed with its plans. State laws
vary in their requirements. Some exempt certain kinds of medical facilities
(particularly private doctors' offices) or projects that cost less than a certain
amount.
Certificate of need laws have intertwined at every stage of their development with programs for area planning of medical resources. The comprehen30
sive health planning programs, set up by 1966 legislation, helped to get state
CON laws passed and often served as advisors to the state boards about applications from their jurisdictions."a These programs, some 200 in all, were replaced by a stronger planning network created by the National Health
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-641), which set up
health systems agencies (HSAs) in their place. In many cases, the old Comprehensive Health Planning (CHP) agency evolved fairly smoothly into the new
HSA. The major new source of strength is that the 1974 law requires all
states to pass CON laws that meet certain minimum requirements set by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). The ultimate decision
is made by the state, but the HSA is the first level of review 2
These laws and the agencies that administer them are directly concerned
with the diffusion of new technologies. In order to acquire an expensive new
technology, a hospital must get the approval of the state board (sometimes it
28.

RUSSELL,

supra note 4, at 65.

29. Id. at 38-39.
30. The Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of 1966,
42 U.S.C. § 246 (1977).
31. S. REP. No. 1285, supra note 24, at 5-13.
32. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300o-2
(1979).
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is possible to get around the review process by buying services rather than
equipment, for example, or by splitting the project into parts, each of which
costs less than the amount for which review is required). 33 In the past, the review boards focused their efforts on applications for additional beds in the belief that total spending was directly proportional to the number of beds and
that most areas already had more beds than necessary. New technologies were
given only the most cursory review.3 4 Recently, boards have begun to appreciate the independent role new technologies play in costs and have given them
more attention. The objective, however, is still to provide everything that is
needed, but at minimum cost. For example, the four Washington, D.C. area
HSAs recently reviewed available and required resources for open-heart surgery in the metropolitan area. At the outset, they accepted that the surgery
should be provided to all who needed it (need being a matter for the physician to decide) and focused on deciding what was the minimum number of
35
facilities necessary to meet that goal.
What effect has certificate of need had on diffusion? We have only the
early experience with state laws on which to base an answer. My work shows
that these laws discouraged the adoption of specific technologies. In states
with laws that went into effect between 1965 and 1969-New York is by far
the largest of the three-certificate of need had two substantial effects. It reduced the proportion of hospitals with open-heart surgery in 1975 by 0.09
(on a scale of zero to one), 36 and it reduced the number of beds per 100 allocated to intensive care by 0.7 to 0.9 (recall that the average allocation was 5
per 100). In states with laws effective between 1970 and 1973, the proportions
of hospitals adopting cobalt and open-heart surgery were reduced somewhat.

My data on technologies end with 1975, so more recent laws had no chance to
show an effect. 37
Salkever and Bice examined the effect of certificate of need on hospitals'
investment in additional beds and on their investment in assets per bed.38 The
33. The guidelines set by HEW require that all investments of $150,000 or more be reviewed.
The state may set a lower limit. 42 C.F.R. § 122.304 (1977).
34. Lewin and Associates, Evaluation of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Section 1122 Review Process, Part 1, 1-11 (1975).
35. The report stated that: "Ideally, an estimate of the future use of specialized cardiac care
services should be based on the local incidence and prevalence of heart disease, an assessment of
the number of individuals who are most likely to require these services, and physician diagnostic
and treatment philosophies (i.e., the continuum of current physician attitudes about the use of
cardiac catheterization and open-heart surgery.)" For lack of information to estimate future use
in this way, a projection was based on past trends in use for the area. "Metropolitan Tertiary
Care Task Force and its Technical Advisory Panel on Cardiac Surgery and Catheterization, A Report on Cardiac Care Services in the Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Area 20" (1978).
36. Restating this in terms of percentages, to maintain consistency with Table II, certificate of
need reduced the proportion of hospitals with open-heart surgery by 9 percent.
37. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 65, 121, 128.
38.

Salkever & Bice, The Impact of Certificate-of-Need Controls on Hospital Investment. 54 MILBANK
[hereinafter cited as The Impact of Certificate-of-Need Controls]. This

MEMORIAL FUND Q. 185 (1976)
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latter measure includes the acquisition of new technologies. Using data for the
period 1968-1972, they concluded that certificate of need reduced the growth
in numbers of beds, but increased investment in assets per bed. Thus, total
hospital investment was no different in states with CON laws than in states
without them, but the pattern of investment changed.
Their data end earlier than mine-1972 rather 1975-making possible
three alternative interpretations of our combined results: (1) they are hopelessly at odds; (2) my results suggest a further redirection of investment, away
from technologies that the reviewers scrutinized closely and suspiciously and
toward others; (3) their results are dominated by the effects of the earlier belief that controlling beds was the key to controlling costs, while mine reflect
the more recent realization that individual technologies must be watched as
well. We agree, however, in the overall conclusion that certificate of need has
changed the pattern of hospital investment. Salkever and Bice find that it has
directed investment away from additions to beds. 9 I find that it has directed
investment away from equipment-based technologies. It has the potential for
directing investment away from particular technologies altogether (or at least
expensive equipment-based technologies) since it focuses on these to the exclusion of other ways of spending. There is, for example, no corresponding
review of hiring decisions.
Salkever and Bice find that the effect of certificate of need on costs is negligible.4" Given that the process itself costs money, this implies that it has so
far failed to achieve its own objective-it costs more than it saves. My results
are for individual technologies and cannot answer this question. Any reduction of expenditures for intensive care beds or cobalt may have been outweighed by expenditures for other kinds of resources.
The certificate of need mechanism is, however, currently being tried more
energetically than ever and there is increasing emphasis on the importance of
closely reviewing technologies. As noted earlier, the federal government now
requires that all states have a certificate of need law. Further, the 1974 federal law requires HEW to set national guidelines for the new HSAs to use in
developing their plans and ultimately in making decisions about certificate of
need applications. The first guidelines were set in 1978 and included a number of technologies.4 What effect these guidelines will have remains to be
seen: they emphasize occupancy rates and minimum numbers of cases per facility rather than more easily applied-and less easily evaded-ratios of facilities to population. In a process that involves as much discretion on the part of
work has been expanded and reported more recently in Salkever & Bice, Hospital Certificate-of-Need ControLs: Impact on Investment, Costs, and Use, (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hospital Certificate-of-Need Controls].
39. The Impact of Certificate-of-Need Controls, supra note 38, at 197.

40. Hospital Certificate-of-Need Controls, supra note 38, at 73.
41. 43 Fed. Reg. 13,040 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 121).
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the regulators as certificate of need, the increasing emphasis on technologies
may portend new and quantitatively more important restraints on the diffusion of many technologies.
For completeness, another new review mechanism, the Professional
Standards Review Organizations (PSROs), must be mentioned. PSROs are designated physician groups in local or regional areas. Their job is to ascertain
that hospital services provided to Medicare and Medicaid patients are necessary and of good quality-that is, that they represent "best practice.'"42 These
groups potentially could affect the use, hence the adoption, of a number of
technologies-including technologies based primarily on people or drugs, or
other resources that do not fall under the jurisdiction of certificate of need
boards.
In practice, because of the concern with costs, they have concentrated on
reducing "unnecessary" hospital admissions and "unnecessarily long" hospital
stays. So far, evaluations of their effectiveness are most useful for what they
suggest about the benefit-cost ratio of such an efficiency approach. The second annual evaluation of the PSROs by HEW found that inpatient days per
1000 Medicare enrollees were lower, other things constant, in areas with
working PSROs. Counting Medicare's savings, the report concluded that
PSROs did a bit better than break even-the ratio of savings to costs was
1." In re-evaluating the evaulation, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
made a number of changes in the analysis. Most importantly, the CBO estimated the savings to the entire system by subtracting the additional fixed
costs shifted to other payers from the savings to Medicare. By this standard
the programs fell well below the break-even point-the ratio of savings to
44
costs was 0.7.
We can look to a wider field of experience than our own for examples of
regulatory approaches aimed at improving technical efficiency in medical
care. Of the three European countries whose policies toward hospital technologies I examined-Sweden, France, and Great Britain-two appear to be
similar to the United States in trying to control costs through efficiency rather
than rationing.45 Sweden has a regional system of hospitals intended to reduce the number of specialized facilities to the minimum needed to provide
everyone with care. Patients are moved to the appropriate hospital if the
nearest one is not adequately specialized. In France, a 1970 law set up a process whereby hospitals must get government approval before acquiring certain
42. Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Fielding, Jessee, The PSRO Hospital Review System, 13 MED.
April 1975 (Supp.), at I.

CARE.

43. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS REVIEW ORGANIZATION: 1978 PROGRAM IEVALUATION, at iv (1979).
44.
U.S. CONG, BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECT OF PSROs ON HEALTH CARE COSIS: CURRENTI
FINDINGS AND FUTURE EVAILUATIONS. at 38 (1979).
45. RUSSELL. supra note 4, at 142-43, 149-53.
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kinds of equipment-e.g., dialysis machines and CT scanners. The government's decision is based in part on national standards-set by the Ministry of
Health-for the appropriate number of facilities per million population.46
The approaches are similar and so are the results. The measure commonly
used to compare the costs of national medical care systems is the percent of
its gross national product each country spends. In 1975, the most recent year
for which international data are available, the United States devoted 8.4 percent of its GNP to medical care. In the same year, the percentages for Sweden
47
and France were 9.2 and 8.1, respectively.
Britain, at 5.4 percent, is obviously different. Britain is unique among the
four countries in having an explicit policy that it cannot and will not provide
everything that might be of benefit in medical care. While it tries to encourage technical efficiency, rationing is an accepted part of the system. The limit
is set by the overall budget of the National Health Service, which has always
been less than enough to provide all the care that doctors and patients would
like to have. The total budget translates into restrictive budgets for individual
hospitals. The results are clear for particular technologies as well as for medical care in general: Britain has fewer CT scanners per million population
than the United States or Sweden, fewer new patients put on dialysis each
year (per million population) than the United States, Sweden, or several other
European countries, and a long waiting list for admission to hospitals.4 8
The cost containment bills proposed by the Carter Administration in the
last two Congressional sessions in some ways resemble the British system of
setting hospital budgets. These bills propose to limit the rate of increase in
hospital revenues to less than the rate of recent years-in some versions of
the bill, considerably less. Although the rhetoric is still that of technical efficiency, the permitted rate of increase is set without regard to the opportunities hospitals might have to add new services of benefit to the patient. The
current version explicitly adds only one point to the proposed rate to allow
for new services in 1979, and makes no allowance for new services in 1980, although the average increase due to new services has been more than 6 percent annually over the last dozen years.

49

46. Law of Dec. 30, 1970, [19711 D.S.L. 56 (Fr.): [1971] J.C.P. 111 No. 10. 3777.
47. Unofficial federal estimates published in Cohn & Miliius, They Make Good by Making Well.
Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1.
48. RUSSELL. supra note 4, at 145-49; Dombey, Sagar. Knapp. Chronic Renal Failure in
Nottingham and Requirementsfor Dialysis and Transplant Facilities. 2 BRIT. MED. J. 484 (1975) give dialysis data for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and several other European countries, but not for
France. Also, Waiting-4ists Lengthen, I LANCET 152 (1977), reprinted in 34 MED. CARE REV. 188
(1977). Jonsson & Newhauser. Letter to the Editor. 299 NEw ENGi AND J. NIED. 665 (1978).
France has fewer CT scanners than Britain, but this clue to its import restrictions on computers
rather than medical care policy.
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If a bill like the proposed one becomes law, it would have major implications for the future diffusion of hospital technologies. Without admitting it
explicitly, it would introduce rationing into the system again. Much of the
current regulatory machinery would become at least partly redundant; if it
was nonetheless left in place, it might still affect the pattern of technological
diffusion, producing results different from the budget system alone or from
the regulatory process that exists now.51
IV
HOSPITAL AND OTHER REGULATORS

For their protection and that of the industry they regulate, regulators develop views that shape their decisions.3' These often have implications for the
adoption of technologies. In this Section, I will reflect on the differences and
similarities in the views of hospital regulators compared to more traditional
regulators.
Noll states that regulators believe that in return for the constraints they,
impose, they should "reduce as much as possible the uncertainty faced by regulated firms. '

2

5

I do not think hospital regulators feel much need to protect

hospitals from uncertainty. The general view is that they are subject to very
little uncertainty as it is. Whatever they decide to do, third party payers will
pay for it. However bad their choices, they, will not suffer financially for
them. In fact, part of the regulators' job is to introduce some of the restraint
that firms in less protected markets would feel naturally, and regulators are
supposed to-and sometimes do-go so far as to close a hospital.
Regulators in other industries suffer from the "sunk cost obsession", the)
"abhor abandoning a capital investment . . . as long as it is in good working
order. 3' 3 Hospital regulators employ a variation of this obsession that colors
their view of potential entrants to the market. Their concern is not that the
new entrant or service will drive out an established hospital or service, but
that it will not. Together, neither will be used to capacity and third party payers will end up paying higher costs because of the "unnecessary duplication."
WELFARE, DIViSION OF MEDICARE COST ESTIMATES,
MEDICAL BENEFIT ESrIMATES: 1980 BUDGET
ASSUMPTIONS (1979) (Table 11).
50. I should mention that there is a great deal of regulation of the industry in the interests of
safe and high-quality care. Radiologic facilities are regulated for the safe handling and shielding
of radioactive substances. Construction requirements are intended to minimize the damage that
fires can cause in an institution where the inhabitants are helpless. Institutions that must
cooperate in patient care are required to have formal transfer agreements. Accreditation of hospitals by the quasi-private Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) requires certain facilities and standards. This involves a large number of regulatory agencies, separate from
those discussed in this paper, and sometimes working at cross purposes.
51.
The common views held by non-hospital regulators are based on NOLL, supra note 1, at
15-32.

52.
53.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
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Other regulators have introduced extensive cross-subsidization in many
industries. 54 In the hospital industry they had only to champion the crosssubsidization that already existed. Again, this has influenced their views toward new entrants. For years, long before hospital regulation became extensive, the view was that nonprofit community hospitals had to provide a "full
range" of services, some of which were not able to cover their full costs.
These services had to be subsidized by others that more than covered their
costs. The growth of third party payment has blurred the distinction between
services that do and do not cover their own costs, but prejudices remain
against potential entrants who are seen as trying to "skim the cream," that is,
provide only the profitable services and leave existing hospitals with the
unprofitable ones. This prejudice is strong against hospitals operated for
profit and against specialized facilities like outpatient surgery centers. In the
latter case, regulators prefer that an outpatient center be associated with a
hospital rather than "freestanding," and carry some of the hospital's overhead
costs. This prejudice can restrict the spread of technologies associated with
them. It has probably done so in the case of outpatient surgical centers. In
any other industry, the argument for the new setting would be that it would
replace more expensive ways of doing the same thing and reduce costs; but
hospital regulators may be justifiably cautious. The general view in the hospital industry is that nothing ever replaces anything; everything is a net addition to the total.
Regulators in other industries are accused of inhibiting the diffusion of
new technologies."' By and large hospital regulators are supposed to inhibit diffusion. The view is that diffusion is too fast and extensive now and, as argued
earlier, it is certainly faster and more extensive than it would be in a less
heavily subsidized market. Regulators are in something of a bind here since
they are not charged, at least not yet, with preventing the acquisition of a
technology if it would have positive benefits for patients. As discussed earlier,
that leaves them a very narrow margin within which to work.

V
CONCLUSIONS

The effect of hospital regulation on the diffusion of new medical
technologies cannot be judged by the degree to which it causes that process to
diverge from the competitive ideal. Before regulation appeared, the growth
of third party payment had already, and quite deliberately, moved the industry miles away from that standard. Further, there is still wide agreement
among policymakers and the public that medical care should not be subject to

54. Id. at 17-18.
55.

Id. at 23 passim.
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the usual economic tests. The belief is that cost-benefit calculations in this sector are immoral: instead everything that is needed, that is, everything with a
benefit greater than zero, should be provided.
Regulatory mechanisms have been superimposed on this system in recent
years and asked to control costs, not by limiting services, but by eliminating
technical inefficiency due to "underuse" and "unnecessary duplication." This
puts the bulk of the cost problem beyond regulatory control. Nonetheless,
certificate of need-the most important of the new regulatory mechanisms
-has influenced the diffusion of certain technologies in carrying out its
charge. In individual states, the diffusion of intensive care, open-heart surgery, and cobalt radiotherapy has been discouraged. But Salkever and Bice's
results suggest that, at least in the early years, the net effect of these actions
was to rearrange investment patterns in certificate of need states, not to reduce costs. Judging certificate of need by its own objectives-the reduction of
costs through the improvement of technical efficiency-one has to conclude
that it has yet to save more money than it spends.
Perceptions and goals in medical care have been changing so fast that it
would be premature to conclude that hospital regulation will continue to limit
itself to this narrow margin of the cost problem. In the 1960s there were
many who argued that technology was not spreading fast enough. Most of the
programs of that decade were aimed at stimulating diffusion and expanding
the use of services, with costs only a secondary concern. Rising costs have
made the full implications of the philosophy that care should be provided
whenever it is needed painfully obvious. As a result, costs have become the
primary concern, and although the rhetoric about services has not changed
much, the reality may be changing. If the Administration's cost containment
bill is the wave of the future, rationing of some sort may be a fact of life
again in the medical care system of the 1980s.
The regulatory process allows considerable discretion on the part of the
regulators. With the regulatory climate changing as fast as it is in medical
care, regulation's past effects may not predict its future effects. Current indications are that future changes will be in the direction of a more general
dampening effect on the diffusion of technologies. Whether these changes are
judged desirable will depend on the future objectives of the system, the success of the regulatory process in meeting them, and the costs it incurs in
doing so.

